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Much state violence is used to coerce populations into complying with the wishes of elites, by 
using the violence to instil fear in an audience beyond the direct victim of the violence. State 
violence of this kind is usually intended to achieve certain political objectives, particularly 
curtailing political opposition. When used in this way, state violence constitutes state 
terrorism. With reference to specific empirical examples the chapter explores state terrorism 
in relation to other forms of state violence. It will begin by introducing the reader to the 
debates on how terrorism generally, and state terrorism specifically, are defined, and will 
demonstrate that these are highly contested terms. Nevertheless, the chapter will show that 
there is sufficient agreement among scholars on the key constitutive elements of terrorism 
that we can adequately define state terrorism based on existing and accepted definitions of 
terrorism. A defining feature of state terrorism, and that which distinguishes it from other 
forms of state violence, is that it involves the illegal targeting of individuals that the state has 
a duty to protect with the aim of instilling fear in a target audience beyond the direct victim. 
In this regard, the chapter challenges the monopoly on legitimate violence that is frequently 
afforded to the state. It shows that any monopoly of violence that the state claims is neither a 
justification for excluding state terrorism from studies of terrorism, and nor, more 
importantly, for affording states the right to use violence in any way they choose.
1
 After 
discussing the ways in which state terrorism is defined, the chapter then outlines the main 
difficulties associated with identifying state terrorism and distinguishing it from other forms 
of state violence. These difficulties relate primarily to questions of motive and agency. The 
chapter explores the measures that scholars can take to overcome these difficulties, with 
reference to various forms that state terrorism can take. 
 
Defining state terrorism in relation to state violence 
 
Totalitarian regimes throughout history, including those of Stalin, Hitler and Pol Pot, have 
used violence to terrorise populations into complying with the regime’s demands. European 
colonial powers used violence in this way to establish and maintain their empires, and to try 
to thwart independence movements in their colonies. The allies during World War II bombed 
civilians in German cities to try and incite the public to turn against Hitler. The Latin 
American national security states during the Cold War, with significant support from the US, 
also deployed violence, including disappearances and torture, to try and curtail support for 
opposition movements. When non-state actors use violence to intimidate an audience beyond 
the direct victim of that violence, we refer to it as terrorism. Yet there has been considerable 
resistance within International Relations scholarship to the notion that states can be 
perpetrators of terrorism, even though the vast majority of state violence, particularly against 
domestic populations, is intended to have a terrorising effect, and results in far higher 
casualties than non-state terrorism does. It is frequently assumed that because the existence of 
the state is based on its monopoly of coercive power, there is a fundamental difference 
                                                 
1 While not the focus of this chapter, it should be noted that in challenging the monopoly on violence that states claim, 
particularly where they use violence in illegitimate ways, it is logical to afford legitimacy to non-state actors involved in 
violent resistance to state tyranny. States deploy the self-defence principle to justify their recourse to violence, which they 
argue constitutes a legitimate use of force. Therefore, non-state actors resisting illegitimate violence by the state should also 




between terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors, and violence perpetrated by the state. In 
other words, states are permitted to use violence, so we should not refer to their use of 
violence as terrorism. Non-state actors, on the other hand, are afforded no such right in 
pursuit of their political objectives hence we refer to their actions as terrorism. There are two 
significant problems with these assumptions. Firstly, terrorism and state violence are being 
differentiated on the basis of who the perpetrator of the act is, rather than on the nature of the 
act itself. Secondly, it incorrectly assumes that because the state has a monopoly on violence, 
any use of violence by the state is permissible. I will show that definitions of terrorism should 
be based on the nature of the act, and not the actor, and that on these grounds, there is no 
reason why actions by the state cannot be labelled as terrorism, if those acts fit the definition. 
I will then demonstrate that just because the state claims a monopoly on the use of violence in 




There is no consensus on how terrorism should be defined. Indeed, as Andrew Silke notes, 
most works on terrorism begin with a discussion of the various associated definitional 
problems of the term (Silke 2004: 2), and the failure of scholars to reach agreement (Badey 
1998: 90-107; Barker 2003: 23; Cooper 2001: 881-93; Duggard 1974: 67-81; Jenkins 1980; 
Weinberg et al. 2004: 777-94). There are nevertheless a group of core characteristics that are 
common to competing definitions. Yet some scholars do not accept that terrorism by states 
should be equated with terrorism by non-state actors. Walter Laqueur, for example, argues 
‘There are basic differences in motives, function and effect between oppression by the state 
(or society or religion) and political terrorism. To equate them, to obliterate them is to spread 
confusion’ (Laqueur 1986: 89). He has also argued that including state terrorism in the study 
of terrorism ‘would have made the study of terrorism impossible, for it would have included 
not only US foreign policy, but also Hitler and Stalin’ (Laqueur 2003: 140). Laqueur’s 
position shows that his analysis of terrorism is actor based, rather than action based. Even if 
the motives, functions and effects of terrorism by states and non-state actors are different, the 
act of terrorism itself is not, since the core characteristics of terrorism are the same whether 
the perpetrator is a state or a non-state actor. Laqueur’s argument also serves to entrench the 
supposed moral legitimacy of state violence. He claims that those who argue state terrorism 
should be included in studies of terrorism ignore the fact that, ‘the very existence of a state is 
based on its monopoly of power. If it were different, states would not have the right, nor be in 
a position, to maintain that minimum of order on which all civilised life rests’ (Laqueur 2003: 
237). Bruce Hoffman has made similar claims. He argues that failing to differentiate between 
state and non-state violence, and equating the innocents killed by states and non-state actors 
would ‘ignore the fact that, even while national armed forces have been responsible for far 
more death and destruction than terrorists might ever aspire to bring about, there nonetheless 
is a fundamental qualitative difference between the two types of violence’. He argues that this 
difference is based upon the historical emergence of ‘rules and accepted norms of behaviour 
that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons’ and ‘proscribe various tactics and outlaw 
attacks on specific categories of targets’. He adds that ‘terrorists’ have by contrast ‘violated 
all these rules’ (Hoffman 1998: 34).2 This argument would only stand if it could be shown 
that states do not violate these rules, as set out in the Geneva Conventions. The reality is that 
they do. Any monopoly of violence that the state has is neither a justification for excluding 
state terrorism from studies of terrorism, nor, more importantly, for affording states the right 
                                                 
2 A more detailed critique of the work of these scholars can be found in Sam Raphael, 'Putting the State Back In: The 
Orthodox Definition of Terrorism and the Critical Need to Address State Terrorism', British International Studies 
Association Annual Conference (Cambridge, UK, 2007). 
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to use violence in any way they choose (Stohl 2006: 4-5). Indeed, even in situations where, 
according to international law and norms, states have the legitimate right to use violence (jus 
ad bellum), it is not always the case that their conduct (jus in bello) is itself legitimate.    
 
There are certain core characteristics common to the many definitions of terrorism. For 
Eugene Victor Walter, terrorism involves three key features: first, threatened or perpetrated 
violence directed at some victim; second, the violent actor intends that violence to induce 
terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the victim, in other words the victim is 
instrumental; and third, the violent actor intends or expects that the terrorised witness to the 
violence will alter their behaviour (Walter 1969). Paul Wilkinson’s widely quoted definition 
echoes Walter’s. Wilkinson argues that terrorism has five main characteristics: 
 
It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror; it is directed at 
a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence; it inherently 
involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians; the acts of 
violence committed are seen by the society in which they occur as extra-normal, in the 
literal sense that they breach the social norms, thus causing a sense of outrage; and 
terrorism is used to try to influence political behaviour in some way. 
(Wilkinson 1992: 228-9) 
 
Both Walter’s and Wilkinson’s definitions identify a specific logic in the use of terrorism, 
namely that it involves not simply harming the direct victim of the violence, but exploiting 
the opportunity afforded by the harm to terrorise others. Similarly, for both Walter and 
Wilkinson, terrorism is defined according to the actions carried out, rather than who the 
actors are, meaning that the state is not precluded as a potential perpetrator of terrorism. In an 
attempt to establish an agenda for research on state terrorism in the 1980s, Christopher 
Mitchell, Michael Stohl, David Carleton and George Lopez, incorporated Walter’s core 
characteristics into their definition of state terrorism.  They argued: 
 
Terrorism by the state (or non-state actors) involves deliberate coercion and violence 
(or the threat thereof) directed at some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme 
fear in some target observers who identify with that victim in such a way that they 
perceive themselves as potential future victims. In this way they are forced to consider 
altering their behaviour in some manner desired by the actor. 
(Mitchell et al. 1986: 5) 
 
While this is not far removed from Wilkinson’s definition of terrorism, it retains one of the 
elements established by Walter, namely, that the threat of violence is sufficient for a state to 
be perpetrating terror. This threat would only be sufficient in a pre-existing climate of fear 
induced by prior acts of state terrorism. As Ted Robert Gurr argues, a threat would not be 
adequate unless it was part of a pattern of activity ‘in which instrumental violence occurs 
often enough that threats of similar violence, made then or later, have their intended effects’ 
(Gurr 1986: 46).  
 
Drawing on existing definitions, and specifically Walter’s, I propose that state terrorism 
involves the following four key elements: 1) there must be a deliberate act of violence against 
individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such an act if a climate of fear 
has already been established through preceding acts of state violence; 2) the act must be 
perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries 
and private security agents; 3) the act or threat of violence is intended to induce extreme fear 
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in some target observers who identify with that victim; and 4) the target audience is forced to 
consider changing their behaviour in some way. With the exception of Walter’s definition, 
the definitions discussed argue that the change in behaviour in the target audience has to be 
political. In line with Walter, I do not make the same claim, since states have frequently used 
violence to terrorise a wider audience so that they subordinate themselves to the wishes of the 
state. Those wishes may of course include lending political support to the state, but those 
wishes may also involve citizens labouring in the interests of elites. This was frequently the 
case in colonial states, where imperialists used terror to coerce citizens into working, often as 
slaves, to extract resources (Blakeley 2009). The strength of Walter’s criteria, therefore, is 
that changes in behaviour other than political behaviour are not precluded. As already 
implied, the key ingredient that distinguishes state terrorism from other forms of state 
repression is its instrumentality.  
 
The importance of the target audience 
The key difference between state terrorism and other forms of state violence is that state 
terrorism involves the illegal targeting of individuals that the state has a duty to protect with 
the intention of creating extreme fear among an audience beyond the direct victim of the 
violence. That audience may be a domestic one, and it may be limited, consisting of only the 
immediate acquaintances of the actual victim. This is significant because it helps us to make 
an important distinction between isolated incidents of criminal activity or state violence on 
the one hand, and state terrorism on the other. The case of torture is helpful for exploring the 
significance of the target audience.  
 
Many victims of state violence are subjected to torture. In some cases torture is carried out 
covertly, and is aimed primarily at tormenting the victim. It of course violates international 
law, but for torture to constitute state terrorism it must be aimed at, or have the effect of, 
terrorising an audience beyond the direct victim. Torture was used in history, very publically, 
as a form of punishment, but also as a means of deterring criminal behaviour (Beccaria 
[1764] 1995; Foucault 1977; Peters 1985; Vidal-Naquet 1963). Torture continues to be used 
as a means of terrorising other incarcerated detainees in order to compel certain behaviour, by 
ensuring that they hear the torture occurring, or see the physical harm inflicted on their fellow 
captives. Torture is often intended to alter behaviour among a much wider audience well 
beyond the walls of the torture chamber. It was used in this way by the Guatemalan state 
during the counterinsurgency war of the 1970s and 1980s, during which, as Amnesty 
International reported, newspapers were permitted to publish photographs of dead torture 
victims: 
 
Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations in the early 1980s […] included the 
terrorisation of targeted rural populations in an effort to ensure that they did not provide 
support for guerrillas. Tortured, dying villagers were displayed to relatives and 
neighbours who were prevented from helping them. Newspapers in urban areas during 
this period were allowed to publish photographs of mutilated bodies, ostensibly as an 
aid to families seeking their missing relatives, but also as a warning to all citizens not to 
oppose the government 
(AI 1976) 
 
The publication of the photographs in the Guatemalan case clearly indicates that the target of 
the terrorism was a very general audience. Indeed the intention was to terrorise the 
populations of entire cities. In some cases a much more specific organisation or set of 
individuals will be the intended audience. Had the victims in the Guatemalan case been 
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members of a specific political group that the government opposed, and had the victims’ 
bodies been returned to the group’s headquarters, the target of the terrorism would have been 
that political group, although others in the community may also have been terrorised if they 
came to know of the torture and murder of those individuals.  
 
If torture occurs in complete secret, and there is no audience to witness it, it is difficult to 
argue that this constitutes state terrorism. For example, if an isolated individual or group of 
prison guards or members of the armed forces secretly used torture, and went to great lengths 
to ensure that no one else knew of it, and there was no evidence that higher authorities had 
sanctioned the torture, we might conclude that this was the criminal act of an individual or 
group, rather than an act of state terrorism. On the other hand, if such an act was carried out 
with the sanction of higher authorities, but the perpetrators and the higher authorities went to 
great lengths to ensure that no one else knew of it, we might conclude that this was an act of 
state violence, since it was perpetrated very clearly on behalf of the state. We could not, 
however, conclude it was state terrorism if there was no audience to witness it. In practice, 
most torture committed by state agents is part of a wider pattern of state repression and in 
many cases, state terrorism. Nevertheless, it is important to make this distinction between 
criminal activities by individuals, state violence, and state terrorism, thereby reserving the 
label of state terrorism for those acts which are both condoned at some level by the state, and 
are intended to or have the effect of terrorising a wider audience. I will discuss in more detail 
below how we might determine when individual acts are part of a wider policy of state 
terrorism.  
 
International law, state violence and state terrorism 
 
Before discussing the forms that state terrorism can take, we must first consider the status of 
state violence and state terrorism in relation to international law. While states claim a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, in that they claim the right to resort to violence 
in self-defence, certain acts of state violence are nevertheless prohibited, even in the course of 
a defensive war. State terrorism, however, has no status as an illegal act in international law. 
It nevertheless may involve certain acts of state violence that are prohibited under 
international law. It is perpetrated with the aim of terrorising others through those illegal acts 
of state violence. In other words, state terrorism involves the deliberate use of violence 
against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, in order to invoke terror in a wider 
audience. The deliberate targeting of civilians in this way, either in armed conflict or in 
peace-time, violates principles enshrined in the two bodies of international law that deal with 
the protection of human rights: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL). Human rights are those rights which all citizens share under 
international law, both in peacetime and during armed conflict. The most fundamental of 
these are the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, the prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of retroactive 
criminal laws (ICRC 2003). Targeting armed enemy combatants is legitimate in warfare, but 
certain acts are nevertheless prohibited. These include killing prisoners of war, or subjecting 
them to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ICRC 1949). These 
constitute illegitimate acts of state violence, Where the laws prohibiting such acts are 
violated, states may also be guilty of state terrorism, if those illegal acts were intended to, or 
had the effect of, terrorising a wider audience, as I will show. IHL also deals with the thorny 
question of what acts are permissible in warfare where civilian casualties are likely to ensue. 
The targeting of civilians is prohibited, both by IHL and IHRL, in times of war and peace. It 
is acknowledged in IHL, however, that civilian casualties are likely to be a secondary effect 
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of certain actions deemed to be legitimate in armed conflict. IHL is therefore concerned with 
ensuring that maximum effort is made to protect civilians when such operations take place, 
and with ensuring that any risks taken with civilian life are proportional to the acts being 
carried out. This is far from straightforward, as I will later show with reference to the use of 
strategic aerial bombardment.  
 
Some IHRL treaties permit governments to derogate from certain obligations in situations of 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation, but there are some rights that are never to 
be violated: 
 
Derogations must, however, be proportional to the crisis at hand, must not be 
introduced on a discriminatory basis and must not contravene other rules of 
international law – including rules of IHL.  Certain human rights are never derogable. 
Among them are the right to life, freedom from torture, or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and prohibition of 
retroactive criminal laws 
(ICRC 2003) 
 
State terrorism involves the derogation from one or more of these against an individual or 
group, in order to invoke fear in a wider audience. The illegally targeted individual may be a 
civilian or an enemy combatant who has been disarmed and is being detained. The law is 
clear that there should be no derogations at all from the provisions of IHL that uphold the 
right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
State terrorism, then, only exists through the illegal targeting of individuals that states have a 
duty to protect. In this regard, as with other forms of state violence, a key ingredient of state 
terrorism is that it involves acts that are illegal under international law. It is deemed illegal 
and inhuman when non-state actors commit those acts, and it is no less inhumane if the 
perpetrator is a state. 
 
The difficulties of identifying state terrorism 
 
Both state terrorism and the illicit use of other forms of violence by the state are prosecutable 
under international law. Nevertheless, it is important to try and determine when states are 
using illicit violence as a means of intimidating an audience beyond the direct victim of the 
violence, thereby committing state terrorism. This is because in so doing they are committing 
not just one but two serious crimes – illegal use of force and an act of terrorism. Determining 
the intentions of state actors is not easy. Often their purposes will, at best, be ambiguous. This 
is largely because in most cases governments seek to conceal the extent to which they use 
terrorism, and when such activities are exposed, they tend to be justified as ‘necessary 
measures’ or more benignly as ‘police action’ (Mitchell et al. 1986: 2-3; Nicholson 1986: 31). 
Obtaining data on acts of terrorism committed by states is extremely difficult, since they tend 
not to advertise their terrorist activities or intent (Chambliss 1989: 203-04; Gibbs 1989: 330; 
Mitchell et al. 1986: 2; Nicholson 1986: 31). When such activities are exposed, considerable 
analytical effort is required to determine whether such an act does constitute state terrorism, 
since they are unlikely to be included in the major data sets of terrorist incidents. This also 
means that drawing concrete conclusions about whether certain acts constitute state terrorism 
may not always be possible, and instead we might need to make inferences from other, 
context-specific evidence. I will explore some of the difficulties involved in identifying state 




State terrorism as a secondary effect 
In some cases, groups within a society may be terrorised as a consequence of other acts of 
state violence. This raises the question of whether we can argue that state terrorism has 
occurred if it is not the primary or only outcome of state violence. According to Mitchell et 
al, if the terror was unintentional, we could not argue that this was ‘true’ terrorism. But this 
assumes that we can determine that the terror was not intentional, rather than one of a number 
of intentions of the act. If we apply this condition, an act of violence cannot be defined as 
state terrorism if it is primarily aimed at harming the victim, a secondary effect of which is to 
terrorise other groups within a population. Mitchell et al illustrate their argument with the 
example of the policies of the Khmer Rouge that were aimed at the destruction of a particular 
sector of society, and which therefore constituted genocide. While this will have instilled 
terror throughout society, this was not the primary intention. By contrast, they argue, policies 
such as US Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam, which involved terrorising people 
associated with members of the National Liberation Front by publically rounding them up, 
torturing and assassinating them, do constitute state terrorism, because terrorising the target 
audience was the primary objective (Mitchell et al. 1986: 6).  
 
Such a sharp distinction should not be made between terrorism as a secondary effect and 
terrorism as the primary objective of an act, particularly in cases where the act itself is 
illegitimate. A parallel can be drawn with Michael Walzer’s work on the legitimacy of acts in 
war which are likely to have evil consequences. He argues that, in line with the jus in bello 
principles, such an act is only permissible providing four conditions hold: 
 
that the act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means […] that it is a 
legitimate act of war; that the direct effect is morally acceptable […] that the intention 
of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not 
one of his ends, nor is it a means to an ends; that the good effect is sufficiently good to 
compensate for allowing the evil effect; it must be justifiable under the proportionality 
rule 
(Walzer 2000: 153) 
 
These conditions can be usefully applied to state terrorism, where it appears to be a secondary 
effect of some other act of state violence. State terrorism in such cases is not the unintended 
secondary effect of some good or indifferent act. It is a consequence of a policy which itself 
is illegitimate, repressive, and on Walzer’s terms, evil. Furthermore, if the state seeks to 
commit genocide, for example, against a specific group, are they not assisted because others 
outside of that group are sufficiently fearful of the consequences for themselves if they were 
to intervene in an attempt to prevent the genocide? And could the terror that arises among 
other groups not be an intended effect, whether primary or secondary? In the case of the 
genocide by Nazi Germany against Jews, gypsies and homosexuals, individuals outside of 
those groups may not have intervened because they had been sufficiently terrorised by the 
increasing intensity of efforts by the Nazis to single these groups out, round them up, and 
transport them to unknown places, and subsequently by the rumours they had heard of 
concentration camps, and of others outside those groups who had attempted to protect the 
vulnerable, themselves disappearing. Indeed, as Gurr notes, Adolf Hitler, while in power, was 
explicit about the fact that his genocidal policies also served as a tool of terror to deter 
opposition: 
 
I shall spread terror through the surprising application of all means. The sudden shock 
of a terrible fear of death is what matters. Why should I deal otherwise with all my 
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political opponents? These so-called atrocities save me hundreds of thousands of 
individual actions against the protestors and discontents. Each one of them will think 
twice to oppose me when he learns what is [awaiting] him in the [concentration] camp 
(Adolf Hitler, cited in Gurr 1986: 46-7) 
 
Even where the terrorism is not a secondary objective, it might prove expedient to the state, 
and should be labelled state terrorism. Walzer argues that to conclude that a secondary effect 
was unintentional there would have to be evidence that the actors involved sought to 
minimise the secondary effect. It is difficult to envisage that a state involved in a genocidal 
policy would be too concerned about minimising the ensuing terror among others outside of 
the targeted group, particularly where the terror may be instrumental to its overall objectives. 
 
The same principle applies if terrorism ensues as a secondary effect of an act that may be 
considered legitimate. The case of the targeting of electrical power during the 1991 Gulf War 
is instructive here. In Operation Desert Storm, the US-led campaign against Iraq in 1990-
1991, civilians were never intended as direct targets. According to the Gulf War Air Power 
Surveys (an analysis carried out by the US Air Force following the Gulf War), ‘there was 
widespread agreement from the outset of the planning process that directly attacking the 
people of Iraq or their food supply was neither compatible with US objectives nor morally 
acceptable to the American people’(Keaney and Cohen 1993: 268). The target categories 
drawn up by the planners also indicate that civilians were not intended as direct targets. The 
authors of the Gulf War Air Power Surveys claim that the air campaign had not only been 
‘precise, efficient and legal, but had resulted in very few civilian casualties’(Keaney and 
Cohen 1993: 305). A Greenpeace International study in 1991 estimated that countrywide 
civilian casualties were 2,278 dead and 5,976 injured (Arkin et al. 1991: 46-7). The Greenpeace 
figure is cited by the Gulf War Air Power Surveys, and is not disputed by the Surveys’ 
authors (Keaney and Cohen 1993: 482). There was, however, considerable controversy 
around the reporting of civilian casualties in the Gulf War, since the Pentagon made no 
attempt to keep records of civilian deaths. As the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported, 
Greenpeace later revised its estimates, but these differed from other estimates. In 1993 
Greenpeace revised its estimate to 3,500 civilian deaths as a result of coalition bombing. The 
US Army War College estimated that 3,000 had been killed, and the government of Iraq put 
the figure at 2,248 (Kelly 2003). Greenpeace did conclude that they found no evidence of 
deliberate targeting of civilians. They did, however highlight the catastrophic human impact 
of the air campaign, caused by the devastation of the Iraqi infrastructure and the intense 
environmental degradation caused by the bombing (Arkin et al. 1991: 5).
 
This was a result of 
the intensity of the air campaign. As Greenpeace report, ‘In one day of the Gulf War, there 
were as many combat missions flown against Iraq as Saddam Hussein experienced in the 
entire Iran-Iraq war’ (Arkin et al. 1991: 6). 
 
There was, however, no indication in the Gulf War Air Power Surveys that measures were 
taken to minimise the secondary effect of terrorising the population, which would 
undoubtedly ensue from aerial bombardment of targets deemed to be legitimate, especially 
given the extensive nature of the bombing campaign. The opposite was true. There was a 
view among a number of those involved in the planning of the air campaign that harming the 
morale of the civilian population would be a welcome secondary effect of the targeting of 
Iraq’s electricity generating capacity: 
 
As for civilian morale, some of the air planners, including General Glosson, felt that 
‘putting the lights out on Baghdad’ would have psychological effects on the average 
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Iraqi […] By demonstrating that Saddam Hussein could not even keep the electricity 
flowing in Baghdad, it was hoped the Ba’th Party’s grip on the Iraqi population could 
be loosened, thereby helping to bring about a change in the regime 
(Keaney and Cohen 1993: 292) 
 
Aerial bombardment that was sufficient to cripple the entire electricity generation capacity of 
modern cities such as Baghdad and Basra, is likely to have resulted in considerable levels of 
fear among the civilian population. This was not seen by the planners as an illegitimate 
secondary effect, but instead as a welcome means by which to undermine the regime. In 
warfare, attacking the morale of enemy soldiers is considered an appropriate means by which 
to attempt to avoid having to fight each and every battalion one by one. However, Walzer’s 
argument requires that measures are taken to minimise the secondary effect, in this case, 
terrorising large sectors of the population. No such measures were taken be the air campaign 
planner. Indeed they hoped that the population would be sufficiently ‘psychologically 
affected’, a euphemism for ‘terrorised’, that opposition to the regime would increase. Rather 
than try and prevent the terrorising of the population, those involved in planning the air 
campaign actively encouraged it, even though this is illegitimate according to IHRL. 
 
The problem of agency: When are state representatives acting on behalf of the state? 
As discussed above, before concluding that an act of violence by a representative of the state 
was an act of state terrorism, we are confronted with a number of challenges relating to 
agency. We must first rule out the possibility that the act was simply an isolated, criminal act 
by an individual as opposed to an act of state violence. We then need to be able to 
demonstrate that the act was intended to or had the effect of terrorising a wider audience than 
the direct victim of the violence. Even then, however, the state still holds a degree of 
responsibility for the actions of its representatives. Whether we conclude that a state 
sanctioned the act, and therefore was complicit in state terrorism through its agents, might 
depend on how the state responds afterwards. If the state fails to prosecute the individual to 
the full extent of the law and fails to compensate the victims, and if the state attempts to 
excuse the actions in some way, the state is condoning the actions of that individual. We can 
argue therefore that the state was complicit. With reference to the use of torture at Abu 
Ghraib, I will demonstrate the importance of context specific evidence in determining firstly, 
whether acts of violence by state agents were acts of state terrorism, and secondly, whether 
those acts were part of an institutionalised policy of state terrorism.  
 
To differentiate between the odd isolated criminal act of a prison officer or member of the 
armed forces, and an act sanctioned by the state, it is important to examine the reaction of the 
relevant officials and the state. If measures are taken, swiftly, to try and punish the 
perpetrator(s) through proper legal and disciplinary channels, and there is no evidence of the 
state sanctioning such activities, we might conclude that this was a criminal act by an 
individual or group, and not an act of state violence. This was indeed what the Pentagon and 
Bush administration claimed once the photographs emerged in 2004 revealing that detainees 
at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq had been tortured by US personnel. Nevertheless, this claim 
cannot be sustained, since there have been very few prosecutions, sentences have been light, 
and punitive measures have been limited to lower ranking soldiers, rather than the senior 
officers involved, or indeed the officials in the Bush administration who fought to ensure that 
methods tantamount to torture be permitted against terror suspects. In a speech on Iraq on 24 




Under the dictator [Saddam Hussein], prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death 
and torture. That same prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few 
American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values 
(Bush, cited in Milbank 2004) 
 
The same conclusions were drawn by Major General Antonio Tabuga in his initial inquiry. 
He concluded that the torture was the work of a few bad apples in need of improved training 
(Taguba 2004: 37).  
 
Yet the record of events uncovered through various leaked documents, traced by Seymour 
Hersh (2004) and now compiled by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (2005), shows that 
despite the public statement condemning torture, the administration had been behind 
numerous attempts to allow torture of detainees in the ‘War on Terror’. Policies outlined in 
the various memos that passed between the upper echelons of the administration, including 
the White House, the Department of Justice, and the senior Counsel to the president, were 
enacted. These included not affording protection under the Geneva Conventions to detainees, 
and allowing torture, including the use of stress positions, extremes of temperature and light, 
hooding, interrogations for 20 hours, forced grooming and removal of clothing, water 
boarding, and the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severe pain 
were imminent, as advocated in a memo from Major General Dunlavey, dated 11 October 
2002, requesting approval for such techniques (Dunlavey 2002). These techniques were 
subsequently sanctioned by Donald Rumsfeld on 2 December 2002 (Haynes 2002).  
 
The response of the administration to the abuses at Abu Ghraib involved proceedings in 
military courts against nine reservists involved in the abuses, three of whom were convicted; 
the other six made plea deals (Gutierrez 2005). None of the senior officers implicated were 
brought to trial, and there was no attempt to hold to account those in the Bush administration 
who had themselves been involved in efforts to legitimise torture. Without examining the 
wider context of the Abu Ghraib case, it would be possible to conclude that this was an 
isolated incident committed by a small number of miscreants, and this was certainly the 
message that the administration attempted to portray. The reality is that there have been many 
cases of abuse in the ‘War on Terror’ at numerous camps in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 
at Guantánamo Bay, at the hands of US and allied forces. Furthermore, the policy of 
extraordinary rendition has resulted in torture and abuse, sanctioned by the US and various 
liberal democratic allies, and carried out by security agents from many countries with 
appalling human rights records (Blakeley 2009). Abu Ghraib, therefore, was not an isolated 
incident, but part of a much bigger pattern of state violence sanctioned by the US state. We 
can also conclude that it is indicative of a pattern of state terrorism, since these practices have 
had the effect of terrorising a wider audience than the direct victims of the disappearances 
and torture.  
 
The case of Abu Ghraib underlines the importance of the wider context when considering 
whether acts of violence by state agents constitute state terrorism. Without evidence of 
intentions, we have to look to the broader context. A further indicator of intention concerns 
the reasonably anticipated likely consequence of an act. If, for example, a state chooses to 
bomb civilian areas of a city, knowing that this is almost certainly going to result in civilian 
casualties, it cannot claim that no harm was meant to civilians. Similarly, if state agents are in 
the business of kidnapping political activists, the state cannot claim that it did not intend to 
terrorise other political activists. If such acts are carried out repeatedly, despite the state 
having already seen that civilians are killed and terrorised by the bombing, and that political 
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activists are fearful, we can conclude that this was the intended outcome of those acts, and 
that the state, therefore is committing acts of terrorism against civilians. 
 
As with various phenomena in the social sciences, determining whether state violence was 
used instrumentally to alter the behaviour of a wider audience than the direct victim, thereby 
constituting state terrorism, requires that we make judgments concerning the motives and 
agency behind specific acts. To legitimately label incidents of violence by representatives of 
the state as state terrorism, those incidents should not be analysed in isolation, but with 
reference to the wider context. This helps overcome some of the ambiguities we face when 
seeking to determine the degree of sanction from the state for those acts of violence, and the 
purpose that they were intended to serve. In some cases it simply may not be possible to 
make a decisive judgement, and it may only be through the passage of time that sufficient 
evidence comes to light to confirm that an act of state terrorism was committed, and to 




States have frequently used violence against their own or external populations as a means of 
achieving their political objectives. State violence frequently also constitutes state terrorism, 
because it is used to instil fear in a wider audience than the direct victim of the violence. This 
is what distinguishes state terrorism from other forms of state violence. It also helps to 
explain why much of the violence deployed by states against its own or another population 
also constitutes state terrorism. States have found terrorism to be functional to the 
achievement of their political objectives, as the examples explored here demonstrate. 
 
Despite the widespread use of state terrorism, there has been considerable opposition to the 
concept within International Relations scholarship. I have shown that the justifications for 
excluding state terrorism as a category of state violence are based on flawed applications of 
the various definitions of terrorism. Existing definitions of terrorism adequately encompass 
acts by state agents. I have shown that state terrorism involves a deliberate threat or act of 
violence against a victim by representatives of the state, or a threat of such when a climate of 
fear already exists through prior acts of state terrorism, which is intended to induce fear in 
some target observers who identify with the victim, so that the target audience is forced to 
consider changing their behaviour in some way. They also reinforce the monopoly on 
legitimate violence afforded to the state, even though within international norms and law, it is 
clear that certain acts of state violence are never permitted. Where widespread state terrorism 
takes place, it may emerge from the use of other forms of state violence, where the main 
objective was not to terrorise, but where this was a secondary, and often welcome 
consequence. With reference to the Just War tradition, I have argued that where state 
terrorism appears to be a secondary effect (albeit an instrumental one) rather than the primary 
motive of some other act, legitimate or not, it still constitutes state terrorism.  
 
Neither definitions of terrorism nor international law pertaining to human rights present 
significant obstacles to scholars of state terrorism. On the contrary, they provide helpful 
criteria by which to identify and oppose state terrorism. The challenge for scholars, however, 
is determining whether acts of violence by state representatives can be labelled state 
terrorism, and when acts of state terrorism are part of a wider, institutionalised policy. As 
with other atrocities, there is a scarcity of evidence that explicitly shows such acts to have 
been sanctioned by the state. We are therefore faced with considerable challenges in 
identifying motive and agency when atrocities are committed. We can overcome some of 
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these challenges by situating specific acts of state violence within a much broader context. 
This involves analysing the circumstances surrounding the events in question, both at the 
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